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ABSTRACT
From its creation in 1999 to its demise as a government-funded 
organisation 11 years later, the Commission for Architecture & the 
Built Environment (CABE) fronted a national drive in England for better 
design in the built environment. Whilst not universally supported at 
home, its scope and ambition were certainly impressive, and as an 
organisation it was unique on a global scale. As such the study of this 
exceptional initiative offers an unparalleled opportunity to shine a 
light on the often unfathomable processes of governing the design of 
development. This paper reflects on the organisation in two key ways. 
First, from the narrow perspective of CABE’s impact: what worked 
and what did not; and what can we learn from CABE. Second, what 
does the experience tell us about the nature and purpose of design 
governance and about the role and legitimacy of government within 
this most “wicked” of policy arenas.
Introduction
Governmental controls over aspects of design in the built environment, for example, for 
devotional purposes (of monarch and/or deity), have a very long history indeed. In modern 
times such activities have been given new meaning and purpose for a wide range of health, 
safety, social, economic, aesthetic and latterly environmental objectives. We can roll all such 
activities together under the banner of design governance, or “The process of state-sanc-
tioned intervention in the means and processes of designing the built environment in order 
to shape both processes and outcomes in a defined public interest” (Carmona 2013).
The British New Labour government of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown from 1997 to 2010 
was tracked for most of its period in power by a second smaller scale experiment in the 
design governance field; one with potentially longer lasting impacts as enshrined in the 
fabric of England’s towns and cities. This was the attempt to address questions of design in 
the built environment through systematic government action. The most significant expres-
sion of this was the work of the Commission for Architecture & the Built Environment (CABE1) 
which sought to understand, campaign for and prescribe solutions to the delivery of better 
architectural, urban and public space design to the nation at large. Yet, while CABE was a 
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publicly funded arm of government, the nature of its work was largely informal and 
non-statutory.
Typically, the evolution of design governance practices have been slow and incremental, 
although from time to time dramatic innovations come along including the instigation of 
zoning practices in Europe and then the US in the early twentieth century, the designation 
of conservation areas/historic districts in the 1960s, the sudden spread of design review 
practices across the US in the 1980s and the development of design coding practices on 
both sides of the Atlantic in the 1990s. The work of CABE in England in the 2000s should 
certainly fall into this category. A detailed exploration of the organisation’s evolution over 
its 11 years, the tools it developed and harnessed for its work, and its position within the 
wider sweep of national design governance approaches in England is provided elsewhere, 
as is discussion of the exhaustive literature on design governance and its methods (see 
Carmona, de Magalhães, and Natarajan 2017). Here, the focus is more specifically on CABE’s 
impact and what that reveals about the legitimacy of design governance at large.
Interrogating CABE
The history of CABE has an uneven arc where from the turn of the century CABE quickly rose 
to become an influential and trusted arm of government, and despite ups and downs con-
tinued to play an important role until its funding and status were abruptly cut around a 
decade later. CABE inherited its core function, the delivery of a nationwide design review 
service, from its predecessor the Royal Fine Art Commission (RFAC) which had been doing 
just that since 1924 (Carmona and Renninger 2017a). The RFAC had been set up as a qua-
si-autonomous non-governmental body (or quango), funded by government but answerable 
to its own commission made up of the great and the good from the design/built environment 
world. Early in its life, CABE demonstrated a strong desire to use its position as the new kid 
on the block in order to rapidly spread its horizons2 from the single design review service 
that it had inherited from the RFAC into the all-important areas of: local authority enabling 
(or providing direct targeted assistance within local government on projects, policy frame-
works, commissioning and capacity building, amongst other things); producing research 
and guidance (the RFAC had done a little of this – Carmona and Renninger 2017b); engaging 
in a wide range of advocacy and campaigning activities within government and beyond; 
and into the skills arena (eg developing tools for school children to engage with design in 
the built environment, and promoting urban design to the established built environment 
professions).
Over time government found ever more reasons to invest in CABE. This both supported 
design quality for its own sake (eg providing core funding to conduct more design review, 
including to support regional providers of a design review service) and a range of more 
specific policy objectives and programmes that greatly expanded (and to some degree 
politicised) the organisation’s role (Arnold 2009). Most notably, this included a major new 
role supporting enhancement of the nation’s green spaces from 2003, and a range of work 
supporting the government’s attempts to tackle the various housing crises throughout the 
2000s. As a result CABE grew rapidly, from just a few staff to around 120 at its height and 
with an annual budget that multiplied over 21 times from the half a million or so pounds 
that it began with.
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Throughout, CABE was steered by a strong commission and executive that were powerful 
flag-bearers, bolstered by a committed pool of staff and a much wider “CABE family” of 
contractors, volunteers and sympathetic organisations. Indeed this engagement of a large 
diaspora across the country in the pursuit of better design, often with little or no remuner-
ation, represented remarkable value for money for the state and one of the critical successes 
of CABE.
When, in its first few years, the commission had the ear of government and decision-mak-
ing was less formalised, CABE was able to be very dynamic. When government funding 
increased, it empowered the commission to grow its staff and thus engage more deeply 
nationwide. This, however, required a far greater formalisation of its processes and under 
the terms of the Clean Neighbourhood and Environment Act 2005, from January 2006 CABE 
became a statutory body, although without statutory powers (other than to exist and con-
duct its services). Its organisational goals also evolved from a focus on challenging the notion 
that architecture was a “stuck on veneer,” in the words of is first Chairman, to a far more 
comprehensive set of built environment goals. Throughout it retained a mission to improve 
the quality of design in the built environment at its heart.
The prominence and status of design quality was clearly strengthened via CABE’s advo-
cacy work across government, and its exhaustive work engaging directly with local govern-
ment and industry, but its total reliance on government for funding meant that its ability to 
provide critique of government programmes or to define and pursue its own priorities was 
sometimes compromised (Parnaby and Short 2008). This tension was built into the DNA of 
the organisation from the start and latterly, as one insider commented, it struggled with 
“how to challenge and collaborate in equal measure.” Its position as the design advisor to 
government, despite its lack of statutory powers to enforce its will, also gave rise to what 
some regarded as an unduly imperious and detached manner in its dealings with industry 
(particularly through design review). Over time this won the organisation an increasing 
number of enemies in influential circles (eg Lock 2009). Not helped by this, or by a less 
favourable attitude to quangos generally within the David Cameron-led coalition govern-
ment from 2010 onwards, CABE ultimately fell victim to the fallout from the economic crisis 
of 2008 and the desire to make rapid savings in the public finances.
In the words of one high profile commissioner, “It wasn’t there to make money, it was 
there as education, policing, cajoling … it was amazing, but it took public funds and bravery 
to do that – a very brave government.” Political support for CABE was absolutely vital through-
out its history and ultimately it was a failure to adequately and irredeemably make the case 
for design amongst its political paymasters that cost the organisation its future leading to 
closure in April 2011 (Waite 2010). Exploring this rich and complex history was the work of 
a major research project funded by the UK’s Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC).
A pump-priming phase
Following announcement of CABE’s closure, the importance of seizing the moment before 
the resources, evidence and collective memory of those involved in the organisation was 
lost was recognised by CABE itself. In the last months of its existence the commission funded 
a quick-fire pump-priming project to explore the possibility of a larger study and, if feasible, 
to assist in making a research application to one of the UK research councils. This initiative 
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funded the location of a researcher within CABE for a period of 25 days with unprecedented 
access to CABE’s remaining personnel and archives. The intention of this phase was to:
•  Work with a team from the UK’s National Archives in order to identify and safeguard 
key resources as part of an evidence base for subsequent research
•  Begin the process of mapping key programmes, outputs, people and responsibilities 
before the organisation closed and the collective memory was lost
•  Start conversations with key stakeholders that have shaped the CABE experiment and 
whose experience needed to be captured as part of the evidence base.
The nature of this work was rapid and exploratory and largely focused on ensuring that a 
subsequent in-depth evaluation of the CABE experiment would be both possible and pro-
ductive through establishing contacts, safeguarding evidence and constructing a draft ana-
lytical framework for the research proposal. This phase was completed in April 2011.
A five-stage, multidimensional, inductive investigation
The substantive research phase ran from January 2013 to August 2014. It employed an 
inductive research methodology that sought to learn from the specifics of practice and apply 
that to an integrated theory of design governance. Five research stages were followed.
Stage 1. Analytical framework building
This work aimed to establish a comprehensive understanding of the international design 
governance literature and relate it to the context of CABE, by:
•  Exploring the theoretical treatment of design within public policy, development, prop-
erty market and political contexts and its position within wider urban policy
•  Tracing the CABE story (and that of the RFAC) in the professional/academic literature 
and in the news media (for example, reviewing over 10 years worth of press clippings), 
and evidence of the methods and impact of any comparator organisations.
•  Developing and deepening the analytical framework of “tools of governance” (as will 
be discussed) providing structure and coherence to the empirical data on CABE and 
a means of coordination to the overall research with its multiple interlocking lines of 
enquiry.
Stage 2. Organisational interrogation
On the basis of documentary analysis (of 2868 source documents) using NVivo software, a 
second stage involved the in-depth review of all key policy, programme, project and per-
formance management documents produced by CABE (and its sponsor government depart-
ments), as well as those produced by periodic external reviews of the organisation. The aim 
was to understand the drivers and barriers to the CABE experience and to trace CABE’s history 
against the wider political and urban policy context. Key outputs included:
•  A series of working organisational maps of how CABE developed over its history and of 
how its work responded to external political priorities and pressures
•  The first full account of the range of CABE tools, programmes, projects, people and 
relationships
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•  A comprehensive review of the key outputs from CABE’s various programmes, with a 
comparison, as far as possible, against the resources dedicated to different steams of 
work
•  An understanding of how the organisation itself operated, established priorities, allo-
cated resources, measured success, etc.
Stage 3. Gathering first-hand views and accounts
Utilising the findings from Stage 2, a range of in-depth semi-structured interviews (39 in 
total) were conducted with two key audiences. First, those both from within and outside of 
CABE (including in government) centrally involved in establishing and developing the organ-
isation and its approaches, and/or eventually in shutting it down. This included both pro-
fessional and political players. Second, interviews with key opinion formers on record as 
being either supportive and/or critical of CABE at various stages in its history. Both sets of 
interviewees were chosen because of their prominence during the organisational interro-
gation. The intention was to:
•  Test the accuracy of the Stage 2 outputs
•  Understand the political, organisational, resourcing, professional and practical drivers 
and barriers for CABE; to get under the skin of the organisation with the benefit that 
distance gives to those once intimately, but now no longer, involved
•  Understand the support given to and critique of the organisation and its work, and the 
roots of such opinions
•  Identify critical episodes in CABE’s work for potential further analysis during Stage 4.
Stage 4. Conducting episode-focused reunions
Key episodes within each tool were chosen for closer inspection, with individual activities 
such as design reviews relating to master planning, research projects focusing on value 
arguments and enabling in the parks sector. This provided deeper understanding of process, 
problematics and impact, rather than trying to somehow deduce lessons from across mul-
tiple disparate episodes. A sample of 24 significant episodes covered the broad sweep of 
modes of intervention and those critical moments for the design agenda that were identified 
by key stakeholders at Stage 3.
“Reunion” events brought together key protagonists from each episode of CABE’s work, 
its partner organisations, and the recipients of the work; followed by more focused individual 
interviews as and when required. The intention of these was to understand both the bigger 
picture and what had worked and what had not, and to gather detailed evidence about the 
effectiveness of key programmes and tools. Each of the 24 reunions was structured around 
the aspirations, processes and outcomes from each episode, and conducted using focus 
group methods of moderation. The free and open discussion between parties was recorded 
and later transcribed before coding, analysis and reflection on how findings might or might 
not be re-interpreted in the post-CABE world.
Stage 5. Synthesis
With multiple analytical techniques, it was important to carefully and individually document 
each stage of the research before attempting a full synthesis and evaluation against the 
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fundamental research questions. Each form of data was subjected to qualitative analytic 
reduction, display, analysis and deduction, and the analytical framework (refined during the 
course of the research) provided a series of related proformas through which to coherently 
summarise and display the data such that it could then be coordinated for synthetic work.
The diverse methodological approaches were written up separately before triangulating 
the evidence as a means to draw out common findings in an inductive manner ultimately 
brought together in this paper. The diversity of approaches helped to and overcome known 
potential weaknesses with each one in order that a more rounded and coherent view of the 
CABE experiment could be revealed. In the discussion that follows, space does not always 
permit a full exposition of the evidence sources underpinning every point made. Each sub-
stantive finding is nevertheless grounded in evidence gathered across the five stages of the 
research collected over two and a half years of detailed investigation.
The impact of state-led design governance
CABE was a product of its time and reflected trends inherent in the larger political economy. 
Underlying the new politics was a “governmentalist” belief in the power of government to 
address key areas of public policy, reflecting in England an historic tendency to take power 
to the centre (House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee 2009). 
New (or greatly extended) areas of policy were developed across government, providing a 
bespoke governance infrastructure to pursue the newly defined public policy goals. The 
treatment of design under the New Labour governments of 1997–2010 is arguably the prime 
example of this, bringing together economic, social and environmental policy components. 
The CABE experience demonstrated a significant extension of public policy in an area that 
British Governments previously had made strenuous efforts to avoid becoming embroiled 
with, preferring instead that design be dealt with behind the closed doors of the RFAC 
(Richards 1980), or as a local matter, or not at all.
Approaches to governance in the period borrowed heavily from the “managerial” methods 
that were then increasingly dominant in the state’s administrative practices (Pierre 1999); 
not just in the development of targets to drive performance (to which CABE was subject) 
but also reflecting a wider move from the 1980s onwards of using dedicated arms length 
agencies that were focused on private sector style missions as part of the neoliberal state. 
Thus, CABE was charged with the role of becoming the government’s advocate on matters 
of built environment design, a role that required it to make value judgements about what 
good design entailed and to “take ownership” of this policy arena. This it did with great 
energy, and quickly came to dominate (some interviewees argued, even over-dominate) the 
field.
Whilst CABE was itself a product of these approaches, the documentary analysis revealed 
that it also applied them in its work programmes, both in managing the CABE family and in 
its belief that influence begins with developing a shared understanding of the problem at 
hand. It, for example, sought to promote an understanding of the processes of design and 
development which would spread an appreciation of generic principles that could be lev-
eraged in optimising the performance of players in the sector, be that developers, regulators, 
investors (public and private) or designers. This was central to the CABE method as, without 
formal regulatory powers of its own to require others to take particular approaches to design, 
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it had to rely on a range of informal tools of influence to do its work (see Carmona 2017a). 
These encompassed:
•  Evidence: Gathering evidence about design and design process to support arguments 
about the importance of design, underpin advice about what works and what does not 
and monitor progress towards particular policy objectives or gauge the state of the built 
environment (eg through research or audits of design practices)
•  Knowledge: Articulating and disseminating knowledge about the nature of good 
design, good and poor design practice, and why it matters (eg through the production 
of practice guides, case studies of best practice and through education and training)
•  Promotion: Making the case for design quality in a more proactive manner by tak-
ing knowledge to key audiences and seeking to package messages in a manner that 
engages attention, wins over hearts and minds and exhorts particular behaviours (eg 
through the use of design awards, campaigning, advocacy work and the building of 
partnerships)
•  Evaluation: Tools through which systematic and objective judgements can be made 
about the quality of design by a party external to, and therefore detached from, the 
design process or product being evaluated (eg through the use of indicators, informal 
design review, certification of schemes and running design competitions)
•  Assistance: Proactive means to engage the public sector directly in projects or in other-
wise shaping the decision-making environment within which design occurs (eg through 
direct financial assistance, and enabling).
These sorts of indirect and informal tools focus predominantly on shaping the decision-mak-
ing environment within which design and its governance occurs (Tiesdell and Allmendinger 
2005). In this role they encourage better processes of design rather than focusing on the 
design of actual projects or other propositions.
Finally, as reflected in the third-way politics of the period, CABE might be seen as one 
attempt to marry “popularism” with “pragmatism” (Hall 2003). In other words constructing 
policy solutions that did not alienate key interests and emphasised what works rather than 
what was dogmatically prescribed in one form of politics or another. Arguably, the new focus 
on design did not become a priority for government in the 2000s simply because the achieve-
ment of better design was intrinsically seen as a good thing. Instead, good place-based 
design was viewed as politically expedient. Firstly, it was a means to popularise (or at least 
sweeten the pill of ) the construction of large quantities of new housing that the nation 
needed, but which faced community opposition fortified by a reaction to the generally poor 
quality of development that had predominated in the 1980s and 1990s. Second, good design 
was a necessary pre-condition for a re-investment in cities, and signalled that the historic 
tendency towards sprawl was to be reversed in favour of a renaissance in urban areas whilst 
protecting the countryside. These were in essence the core arguments of the Urban Task 
Force (1999) which the government had commissioned to look into the urban challenges 
of the time. Government signed up to the urban renaissance agenda and with it also to 
CABE.
Taking a broader look at the extensive urban governance literature revealed a triad of 
fundamental characteristics within whose parameters urban governance of all types sits. 
Whilst space does not permit a full exploration here (see Carmona 2017a), in sum they are: 
the mode of operation, whether ideological (directed at particular political objectives) or 
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managerial in style; the relative concentration of public authority, whether centralised or 
disaggregated, including to arms length agencies; and the power to deliver, whether public- 
or market-oriented. Relating the framework to the work of CABE (Figure 1), the organisation 
can be represented as:
•  Ideological but pragmatic – focused on a single core objective, the national improve-
ment of design quality (broadly defined), but pragmatically extending and developing 
that agenda in line with the policy and political priorities around it
•  Centralised decentralisation – delegation from government direct to a single arms-
length organisation (CABE), but through them to a network of approved regional organ-
isations and a wider CABE family across the country
•  Publically oriented/active – 100% state funded and controlled with only indirect non-di-
rective powers, but through its considerable authority, energy and initiative, able to 
set and drive a national agenda for design that public and private players alike could 
not ignore.
Perceptions of CABE
Whilst some of the governance trends discussed above pre-dated New Labour, notably the 
growing interest in the importance of design in government, they strongly set the context 
for the work of CABE and (evidence from the reunions suggested) were reflected in how the 
organisation saw itself and its role, and how others perceived it and whether it was being 
effective or not. In this regard an important point to make is the seemingly obvious one that 
CABE was by no means universally popular. Indeed, as was obvious in press reports, from 
the very start the organisation was often under fire from different players that it rubbed up 
against: sometimes architects (who hadn’t fared well in design reviews), sometimes national 
politicians (whose policies seemed to be called into question on design grounds), sometimes 
professional institutes (who felt CABE was encroaching on their turf ) and sometimes devel-
opers (who no longer had quite such a free hand). Indeed, as one interviewee suggested, 
only partly in jest, “by the end CABE had pretty much alienated everyone which perhaps 
explained its demise.”
That of course hugely overstates the case, as underpinning these tensions was a clear 
and seemingly popular agenda – the pursuit of design quality – that the organisation 
public      market 
Figure 1. The CABE design governance model.
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pursued with great energy, initiative, leadership and (usually) focus for over a decade. 
Therefore, whilst many criticised aspects of its activities and governance style (as will be 
seen) the evidence gathered during the research pointed to overwhelming support for much 
of what CABE did and a ready acceptance that the organisation played a very significant role 
in changing the perceived importance and actual delivery of design quality in England and 
beyond. Yet as an organisation, CABE was never well understood in terms of its size and 
scope and its relationship to government, and many of the harshest critiques of its work 
seem to stem from this simple fact, as the following sections reveal.
Whilst external perceptions (notably in the professional media) were often of a monolith 
swallowing up huge dollops of tax payer’s money to conduct design review, in fact the 
organisation was tiny by government quango standards, and only around a fifth of its staff 
were dedicated to design review where most of the headlines (and periodic controversy) 
had their roots (eg Blackler 2004; Clover 2004). The rest of the staff worked on lower profile 
but typically (if evidence from across the research stages is to be believed) highly regarded 
and effective activities such as: enabling in local authorities; a range of research projects, 
the work of its public spaces and parks arm (CABE Space); the Building for Life initiative3; 
and various educational enterprises. Moreover, whilst at its height CABE boasted an annual 
budget of around £11.6 million, increasingly large proportions of this represented annualised 
project funding to deliver particular ring-fenced programmes of government rather than 
CABE’s core services. Most of this in turn focussed on injecting a quality dimension into the 
sizable capital expenditure programmes of New Labour, such as the Building Schools for 
the Future initiative.4
CABE, before and after
Notwithstanding the clear antecedence of many of the governance trends in which it was 
embedded, CABE will always be associated with New Labour. To some degree, however, 
CABE found itself stuck between a rock and a hard place courtesy of its relationship with the 
Labour government. Thus, whilst central government saw CABE as a highly competent deliv-
ery organisation and increasingly loaded it up with “programmes” to roll out, this left the 
organisation vulnerable to the whims of ministers, to the annualised public spending round, 
and to perceptions that CABE was getting flabby. Some interviewees argued that such pro-
grammes also diverted its attention and energies away from its own design leadership role. 
Moreover, whilst gaining considerable authority as the government’s de facto design arm, 
the reliance on public money for survival left CABE at least partially gagged and increasingly 
unable to claim true independence. Indeed the documentary record shows that on several 
occasions the organisation had its wrists firmly slapped when the more control-minded 
ministers of New Labour’s later years detected that government policy was not always being 
fully supported by CABE’s programmes.
In the UK, the renewed effort to positively address questions of design in the built envi-
ronment through public policy (which CABE later fronted) began under the final Conservative 
administration of the 1990s. Acting partly on the basis of personal interest, but also in the 
face of the same issues around housing growth and where it should go that later confronted 
New Labour, the then Secretary of State, John Gummer, transformed the policy environment 
in relation to design (Carmona 2001, 72). Under him, design moved from the proscribed list 
(for public intervention) to the prescribed one and urban design became the new focus for 
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policy instead of aesthetic control. This move provided a firm basis for the rise of design 
further up the political agenda in the New Labour years. In the UK it gives the lie to arguments 
that CABE was exclusively a project of the left, whilst internationally it undermines arguments 
that design quality is anything other than an apolitical matter. Thus, whilst some have argued 
that the pursuit of better design is an elitist concern and associate its regulation with the 
political right (Cuthbert 2011, 224), others conflate attempts to correct market failure through 
government action with the left and see attempts to control design as the needless impo-
sition of barriers to change and innovation within the free-market (Van Doren 2005, 45; 64). 
In both cases design tends to be equated with a narrow concern for “aesthetics” rather than 
with the more fundamental issues around functionality, liveability, sustainability, economic 
viability and social equity that became CABE’s design agenda.
Comparing, the different models of state-led design governance that have been deployed 
in England since 1924 (Table 1), in many respects the CABE experience can be viewed as a 
middle way. Thus, whereas the RFAC was ideological in its outlook and often uncompromising 
in its advice, albeit easily sidelined behind its seemingly exclusive St James’s Square door in 
London’s Mayfair (Carmona and Renninger 2017a), the design governance landscape of the 
post-CABE austerity years provides only uncoordinated provision of design governance 
services and views about design out of which little commonality prevails (Carmona 2016). 
By contrast, the CABE years provide a clear point of national leadership, but one reasonably 
responsive to the diversity of contexts (political and geographical) within which it operated, 
care of coordination through a coherent regional network of design governance providers 
that reached out across the country.
Moreover, whilst both the RFAC and CABE had in common that they were public functions 
of the state with a clear orientation towards the public sector – contrasting with the mar-
ket-led approaches (most notably to providing design review) and voluntarism (eg the Place 
Alliance5) that now dominate in the post-CABE (austerity) years – they also enjoyed central 
funding and experienced vulnerability to the winds of political change because of it. CABE 
nevertheless had in common with the post-CABE era that it was highly active in its advocacy 
for design and fully exploited the range of tools available to it. Likewise, in the absence of 
CABE, the market is highly active in selling the services that it now provides, flexibly adapting 
CABE’s protocols to meet business opportunities wherever they can be found, and this is 
complemented by voluntary action that, with little or no resources, seeks to fill the gaps 
(Carmona 2016).
Table 1. National design governance models compared.
RFAC CABE Austerity
Operation Ideological Ideological but 
pragmatic
Managerial
Authority Centralised Centralised 
decentralisation
Disaggregated
Power Publically-oriented / 
passive
Publically-oriented / 
active
Market-oriented (with 
gaps)
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CABE’s impact
Turning from its modus operandi to its achievements, many of those interviewed for the 
research reported that impact was a particularly difficult issue to get a handle on and even 
more difficult to measure. In part this may be because many of CABE’s impacts were so diffuse 
in nature, and focused on influencing the decision-making environment for design (the 
processes of quality), rather than in making specific and tangible interventions in projects 
or places. Consequently, when compared with more focused organisations, some of those 
interviewed could readily see the costs, but not always the benefits; helping to explain the 
widespread negative perceptions about the size and cost of CABE amongst built environment 
professionals.
Despite this, the detailed examination of CABE’s work and legacy that formed the core 
of this research revealed a number of profound and tangible impacts as reported in the 
literature, through the interviews and reunions, or documented in the press or CABE’s 
archives. Whilst CABE’s mission was cut short in 2010, many of these impacts, categorised 
in Table 2 on the basis of the evidence gathered during the research, are still apparent five 
years after CABE’s demise, including its impact on national policy, on the projects it reviewed 
and on key development stakeholders such as some, although not all, of the nation’s volume 
housebuilders.
As a small organisation (by governmental standards) CABE undoubtedly punched above 
its weight, demonstrating in the process how, despite its diminutive size, such an organisa-
tion might operate within and across government. But CABE also had to regularly make the 
case for its existence and the “value it added,” and, as an unpublished Handover Note on the 
subject revealed (CABE 2011), CABE was evaluated around 20 times during its existence,6 
most notably as a feed into the then government’s Comprehensive Spending Reviews of 
2004, 2007 and 2010.
In its final and most comprehensive self-examination – Making the Case – CABE submitted 
a 50,000 word case to government that, in its own words, made “a compelling case for CABE’s 
impact” (CABE 2010). The evidence was indeed extensive and varied, and ranged from the 
quantifiable, such as an assessment that CABE’s design review services resulted in users 
benefiting from expertise with a market value of £684,450 per annum that cost the public 
purse only £163,800, to the unquantifiable, such as the impact of CABE’s work on the life 
choices of the thousands of school children that came into contact with CABE’s educational 
materials. Benefits ranged from the highly tangible, for example, that satisfaction surveys 
revealed 88% of users found CABE’s enabling advice useful and 84% found that enabling 
advice changed what they did, to the intangible, such as the ultimate impact of the green 
space strategies prepared by the 180 councils using tools that CABE had provided. In this 
and other documents CABE made regular and extensive use of its own research, as well as 
that conducted by others (internationally), to make the case that better design could have 
a positive impact on health, education, well-being, the economy, safety, levels of crime and 
environmental sustainability, amongst other factors.
Such evidence remained convincing as long as politicians were committed to CABE and 
were open to accepting the case CABE regularly made for its own existence. History shows, 
however, that when resources ran short, political expediency simply dictated that this sort 
of evidence was ignored and CABE was shut down.
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The use of multiple overlapping informal tools and commitment to the cause
The collective efforts of the CABE family enabled a proliferation of activities with regional 
outreach, and involved a wide range of informal design governance tools, although never 
with regulatory force. Indeed CABE decisively supported and/or pioneered a range of new 
tools, including its enabling service, Building for Life, housing audits,7 and urban design 
summer schools. All of these had a strong impact, if judged by the numbers they reached, 
and alongside their research, extensive output of guidance and high-profile advocacy and 
campaigning work (which CABE took to new heights), helped to build a strong reputation 
for CABE across the country. At the same time there was always a significant body of profes-
sionals and others who actively opposed CABE, many of whom, as revealed in extensive 
press coverage, tended to view the organisation largely in terms of its design review function. 
As CABE expanded its reach and prominence, this criticism grew and the organisation was 
more frequently seen as overstepping its remit or acting in a domineering or overly aggres-
sive manner. So while CABE had confidence in its public interest role, some were concerned 
that it increasingly appeared to colonise rather than engage other bodies and professionals 
that were acting in the same field (Ibrahim 2009).
Where CABE differed most decisively from what came before and after is in the sheer 
scale of activities that its significant public funding allowed, and, over time, the ability that 
gave the organisation to proactively reshape the landscape for design governance in 
England. In this regard CABE undoubtedly had a big impact, and the majority of those inter-
viewed or who attended the reunions saw that impact as a broadly positive one if measured 
against its core objective of improving the standard of design in the built environment. As 
one insider commented, “CABE didn’t lead the profligate life, it was relatively tightly funded, 
but it had a meaningful sum and it had a sum where it could have an impact beyond the 
individual schemes that it saw,” both cumulatively (project by project and on larger places) 
as well as on the larger national demand for better design as encapsulated in political 
priorities.
In its early years, CABE was sometimes referred to as an unconventional organisation; 
within and funded by government, but not in a governmental mould. Instead it was able to 
agitate, innovate and shake things up, and exploit tactics not usually associated with the 
public sector to influence those not previously receptive to or interested in its messages 
about the significance of design. Whilst, as the organisation grew and matured this “guerrilla” 
phase of its evolution came to an end (indeed had to end when it ran into trouble – Brown 
2004), CABE remained a very determined unit and one unusually effective at responding to 
the changing political context within which it found itself.
In part, this seems to be because of the persistence of a culture that emphasised continued 
learning and innovation and the flexible application of its knowledge and practices to the 
range of challenges that the organisation addressed. For example, and unusually for such a 
quango, from the very beginning it had its own research section. It also reflects the fact that 
the sorts of “informal” tools at its disposal were particularly adaptable and not subject to the 
rigidity of being defined in statute or circumscribed by government policy. Its tools also lent 
themselves to use in combination so that particular challenging problems, such as the design 
of volume built housing, could be confronted from different angles and with different com-
binations of evidence, knowledge, promotion, evaluation and assistance, depending on the 
need and the possibility of influence in any particular context.
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A key lesson from CABE is therefore that despite the limitations of its individual powers, 
its ability to spread its messages on multiple fronts and through a diverse and continually 
changing toolkit, made it a very effective organisation. As the period prior to CABE’s existence 
(and perhaps the period after) revealed (Carmona and Renninger 2017b), the over-reliance 
on a single tool (namely, design review) will only ever have a limited impact and eventually, 
as happened with the RFAC, those limitations will come to define (and undermine) the whole 
process of governing design (Fisher 1998). Instead, the CABE experiment powerfully demon-
strated that the use of multiple overlapping informal design governance tools not only cover 
the design governance field of action (from shaping the design decision-making environ-
ment, to influencing particular project outcomes) more comprehensively than formal reg-
ulatory tools, but can also decisively influence the manner in which those formal tools 
operate, in turn enabling them to operate more effectively.
The legitimacy of design governance
New Labour was a pragmatic experiment immersed in the “third way” philosophy of “if it 
works, back it” rather than on basis of any dogmatic belief systems (perhaps explaining why 
it was, and still is, despised by so many). Considered in its own terms as the pragmatic appli-
cation of flexible tools to different circumstances, as opposed to the dogmatic application 
of systematic rules everywhere (see Figure 1), the CABE experiment must be judged a success. 
It amounted to an investment by the state of the equivalent of 0.02% of the size of the 
construction industry in England (Carmona 2011) that had very significant impacts on the 
cultures and practices of development nationally and on design governance processes 
locally, leading to a new sensitivity towards an interest in design (as the reunion discussions 
repeatedly reinforced).
But the CABE experiment represents just one approach to state-led design governance 
and its successes should not be taken to imply either that such an approach would be suit-
able everywhere or at any time, or that all (other) forms of intervention in design by govern-
ment and its agencies are necessarily also effective. A considerable literature suggests that 
this is far from the case and that poor design governance is often as bad, or perhaps worse, 
than none at all (eg Ben-Joseph 2005; Talen 2012). Moreover, not everything CABE touched 
was a success. Some tools, such as the use of design competitions, never got any momentum, 
whilst others, notably design review, were often mired in controversy, although ultimately 
had a significant positive impact on a diverse range of projects (Figure 2).
Multifarious critiques
A range of theoretical problematics of design and its governance have been set out else-
where (Carmona 2017b) and CABE was accused of all of those (and more) during the course 
of its existence. During the research these multifarious critiques (many contradictory) were 
frequently, and often compellingly, re-stated by interviewees, in the reunions and in the 
press clippings analysed as part of the work. Summarising them, CABE was accused of being:
•  A neoliberal pro-development tool: simply sweetening the pill of otherwise unpalata-
ble and inequitable projects that offered little to society at large – “they were just very 
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(I) (II)
(III)
(IV)
(V)
(VI) (VII)
Figure 2. CABE’s influence was profoundly positive on a wide range of successful projects as diverse as 
the Birmingham library (i), Sheffield Peace Gardens (ii), Liverpool One retail quarter (iii), the Crossrail 
stations in London (iv) and the 2012 Olympic projects both in London (v) and elsewhere, numerous school 
projects across the country (vi), and many residential-led master plans, such as Kidbrooke Village (vii).
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focused on the message that any kind of work with the built environment and green 
space should add profits”
•  A poodle of the state: too nervous of upsetting its sponsors and therefore lacking the 
ability to confront government when it needed to be done – “it was the government’s 
little toy to help it do some things that it was easier to do at arm’s length”
•  London-centric: because that was where the money, politics and biggest projects were 
– “it became evident that they were a London based coterie of chums, all the way down, 
the agenda, the menu, the interest is London luvvies, they were not interested in the 
rest of England”
•  Preoccupied with “shiny urbanism”: reflecting the recipes of the “urban renaissance” and 
the metropolitan fascination with “starchitects,” rather than the challenges of suburban 
England where most wanted to live – “the town cramming, high density, mixed use, 
ban cars, café culture and all that vision that Lord Rogers foisted upon people, that was 
their agenda”
•  Too unfocused: expanding too readily into different agendas and getting distracted from 
its core mission – “CABE was so bound up delivering these Service Level Agreements for 
government; we couldn’t see the wood for the trees, we were doing too much”
•  Elitist in multiple ways: organisationally elitist (assuming that CABE should lead and 
others would follow); professionally elitist (because architectural design is inevitably so); 
exclusionary (only engaging positively with those already in the clique, aka the “CABE 
family”); elitist in its processes (particularly the “closed shop” of design review) – “elitism, 
dear God, yes. They were going to produce standards and guidance, which the rest of 
us would just have to be obliged to follow”
•  Not elitist enough: failing to bring the powerful architectural establishment on board as 
key supporters of the organisation – “they should have had somebody who was much 
more embedded in the central London chattering classes of architects, who knew those 
people, who could talk to them”
•  Scared of aesthetics: and determined to see design in purely objective terms, whereas, in 
reality, it was not – “sometimes something would come into design review and nobody 
would say “that is incredibly ugly” because everything was based on facts and figures 
to avoid design being seen to be a matter of taste”
•  Style biased: with an in built bias towards contemporary design and against traditional 
architecture – “It was certainly pro-modernist, … they thought that anything that might 
be a classical design was basically pastiche and therefore couldn’t be dealt with and 
was rubbish”
•  Inconsistent in its advice: because much was intangible and not everything or everyone 
could be boiled down to a simple set of objective criteria – “you had some completely 
opposing views from some of the CABE commissioners. If you got the wrong one on 
your committee, then you knew you were in for trouble”
•  Too powerful and undermining freedom: by imposing a state-sanctioned view on design 
that often ventured into matters of detail (aesthetic and functional) that should rightfully 
be a matter for the scheme promoter – “you might find that CABE stifled as many good 
buildings as it encouraged, and who are they, or who are we, to judge whether those 
are good or bad buildings ultimately”
•  Too weak: because they worked through influence rather than compulsion and therefore 
influenced those who wished to hear the message and not those who didn’t – “if they’d 
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ever found a way in which they could actually get the housebuilders in a headlock, that 
would be fine, but they didn’t”
•  Insensitive to professional responsibility: by failing to take account of the professional 
standing and perspective of those it sought to advise – “you spend seven years in 
training, then a lot time gaining experience and, actually, that should be enough, then 
an outside organisation such as CABE takes the responsibility away from the architect. 
… there’s a kind of emasculation if you like.”
•  Insensitive to the market: lacking market nous by being often divorced from the com-
mercial concerns of the different markets in which they were offering advice – “when 
you’re considering a scheme in an affluent area of west London, and you’re doing one 
in a regeneration area, you have to look at things differently … so cutting your cloth 
accordingly is very important and CABE didn’t quite understand that”
•  Overbearing and arrogant: by stealing the work and initiatives of others without giving 
sufficient credit and by being insufficiently supportive and too condescending to those 
it dealt with – “it was almost like you were at school … You know, the sort of school 
‘teachery’ thing ‘I know best, stop talking, shut up and listen to what I’m saying and 
don’t question it’.”
•  Too verbose: pronouncing too much and producing too much guidance – “ultimately, 
there’s only so much guidance you can read – it just gets put on shelves”
•  Obsessed with communication: believing that being heard was more important than 
what was said – “they brought in lots of people that had nothing to do with the built 
environment, they became increasingly interested in media output, as opposed to actu-
ally serious, proper information and guidance”
•  Too flabby and over-managed: growing too large with too many managers and not 
enough workers – “CABE had got bigger and bigger and bigger and more and more 
bureaucratic”
•  Subject to conflicts of interest: conflicts that were more perceived than real but never-
theless at key times damaging to CABE’s credibility and its standing within the sector 
– “we were told by the then permanent secretary that … ‘CABE’s in the pocket of the 
developers isn’t it?’.”
Those interviewed during the course of the research typically took either a positive or neg-
ative stance towards CABE, with views tending to be expressed on the basis of personal 
opinion supported by anecdote, rather than on the basis of evidence, which perhaps explains 
some of the contrasting perceptions. Noticeably, those who were critical of the organisation 
tended to take an overwhelmingly negative (sometimes vitriolic) perspective across the 
board, whilst those (a significant majority) who took a predominantly positive stance were 
more willing to entertain a degree of truth in many of the critiques; recognising that CABE 
was far from a perfect organisation.
Most of the latter types were sanguine that such criticisms were par for the course, and 
that largely the same critiques would have been made about any other organisation in a 
similar field.8 As one commissioner concluded: “It would be hugely naive to imagine that 
the kind of glory years, if I can put it like that, when you’re brand shiny and new, will last. 
There’s nothing unexpected, or unusual about that. You wouldn’t find a public body, or public 
agency in the world where people aren’t saying it’s too this, or too that, or too big, or too 
small, or too powerful, or too weak. That just goes with the territory.”
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A simple case for intervention
So given the inevitability of the critiques, and their at least partial legitimacy, what is the 
moral/societal case for continued intervention in this area? Ultimately, as CABE’s life and 
demise demonstrated, that is a political judgement. Pragmatically the CABE experiment has 
shown widespread, tangible and positive results leading to a long-term legacy of better 
projects, places and processes than would otherwise have been the case, and with positive 
impacts across England on local populations, the environment and society at large (see Table 
2). This is in exchange for, what by any standard, was a very small national investment in the 
field, almost an “accounting error” in governmental terms as one interviewee described it.
Yet, this will need to be set against other costs, beginning with the unknown but certainly 
much larger investment by the private and/or public actors by dint of simply engaging with 
services of design governance, such as those CABE provided: for example, through getting 
involved in a processes of enabling; attending a training event; or turning up to a design 
review and afterwards amending a scheme. Also, beyond the financials, there are other costs, 
notably accruing to those whose freedoms have been curtailed to design (well or badly) by 
such processes, or to professional egos that have been damaged as a result. Finally, there 
will be costs in the mistakes that from time to time even the most sophisticated and carefully 
run processes of design governance will inevitably make (Figure 3).
Figure 3. One of CABE’s mistakes as widely recognised by those who were involved, as one influential 
insider commented: “The Walkie Talkie is more elegant, believe it or not, as a consequence of CABE’s 
reviews of it, but obviously, there will always be projects like that where we could and should have done 
more.”
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Morally, politicians will need to decide where their priorities lie. The CABE experiment 
shows that, despite the cost, the case is weighted very heavily on the side of intelligent light 
touch intervention through the full range of design governance tools. Politicians will have 
to explain, when we know what good urban design means and the benefits it brings, and 
when we know how to design good places and how to facilitate those processes, why we 
still fail to do so and why (too often) they don’t care enough to learn the lessons and start 
to turn the situation around.
Conclusion
Following the passage through the Houses of Parliament of the statutory instrument that 
formally dissolved CABE, John Penrose, the Tourism and Heritage Minister at the time who 
signed the order, commented in the House of Commons:
CABE did a lot of good work and much of it will continue in different places. The organisation 
may be coming to an end under the order, but its work and the principles that it embodied will 
continue. I hope and expect that the public sector’s commitment to good design in our built 
environment will continue, too.9
A CABE employee commented: “We always used to joke that CABE was working towards its 
own demise, and that the subject matter would be so mainstreamed that it wasn’t necessary 
anymore and, possibly, it achieved that. … it’s still out there, its messages, its lessons, its 
teachings, its ideals are still run of the mill to a certain extent.”
Equally, it could be argued that CABE failed to sufficiently make the case for design and 
so, faced with choices about where to make the spending cuts, the coalition government 
of 2010–2015 decided that the axe would fall on CABE. For others, the seeds of CABE’s demise 
were sown when CABE became a statutory organisation and “came into the mainstream.” 
As one commissioner argued, “if you take the terrorist out of the organisation, you remove 
the agitation and when you remove the agitation, it’s very easy to remove the organisation.” 
Another commented “the criticisms were either that CABE wasn’t doing enough, or it was 
doing too much, which is probably a sign that it was doing about right.”
Drawing from the experiences of CABE to address the question, ‘how should design gov-
ernance be conducted?’, the answer can only be, rather inconclusively, that ‘it depends’. It 
depends on the context within which it is being conducted, over what scale, by whom, with 
what intentions, and with what resources. Recognising this diversity and shaping their tools 
to each challenge, nationally, or locally, was the great strength of CABE. So wherever the 
environment within which it is being conducted, it is possible to conclude that those respon-
sible should fully embrace the informal as well as formal modes of design governance, and 
should consider such processes to be part of a long-term and necessary societal investment 
in place.
The situation in England post-CABE has revealed that all too quickly it is possible to forget 
the difference that such a coherent and sustained investment in state (and local) design 
governance infrastructure can make, and to focus instead on making cuts in the areas that 
are politically easiest (where opposition is least vociferous) and that are least tied up in 
statutory obligations. These include the sorts of discretionary services that relate to design. 
Again, this was arguably a failure of CABE (despite its stated intentions), to adequately reach 
out to a larger constituency beyond the built environment professionals that were already 
convinced and to create a demand for good design within the population at large; or to take 
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advantage of the opportunities that came CABE’s way to make the case for underpinning 
its activities (notably design review) with a formal and statutory status that would have tied 
them into the non-discretionary machinery of the state. So, whilst during its existence CABE 
undoubtedly changed the culture for design and played a critical role in driving design up 
the political agenda, both nationally and locally, this was a culture change built on sand. 
When CABE was no longer around to remind us of the importance of good design, we quickly 
forgot.
The situation post 2011 has shown that, unlike, for example, health, defence or education, 
the quality of the built environment is simply one of those areas that we need to keep on 
reminding ourselves has value and should be a prime concern of the state. As, in England, 
the cost of poor design mounts, sooner or later we will need to remember.
Notes
1.  Throughout this paper references to “CABE” relate only to the government-funded body that 
existed from August 1999 to April 2011 and not to “Design Council CABE” that initially inherited 
some of CABE’s functions but which no longer receives core government funding and is now 
one of many market players providing design review services in England.
2.  The archive website for CABE still demonstrates the diversity of its interests and initiatives, see: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110118095356/http:/www.cabe.org.uk/.
3.  http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110118095356/http:/www.cabe.org.uk/building-
for-life.
4.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Building_Schools_for_the_Future.
5.  See: http://placealliance.org.uk.
6.  Sometimes externally and sometimes internally, but excluding its own annual reports.
7.  http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110118095356/http:/www.cabe.org.uk/housing/
audit.
8.  For example, about The Arts Council or English Heritage.
9.  https://www.gov.uk/government/news/commission-for-architecture-and-the-built-
environment.
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